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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WILFORD N. HANSEN and VADA J.
HANSEN/ husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Appellants

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

vs.
JOHN J- STEWART and ALICE E.K.
STEWART, husband and wife,

Supreme Court No. 19383

Defendants/Respondents

NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was originally brought to determine the location
of a boundary line between property owned by Plaintiffs and
property owned by Defendants.

Since the location of that

boundary line hinged on the location of the northeast corner of
the Lot 12, Block 34 of the Providence Farm Survey, and in an
attempt to limit and simplify the issues at trial, all parties
mutually stipulated to waive all other claims and to proceed to
trial on the sole issue of the location of the lot corner, which
would in turn establish the south boundary line of Defendants1
property and the north boundary line of Plaintiffs1 property.
The Parties further stipulated that the prevailing party was
entitled to judgement for monetary damages in the amount of
$5,000.00.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Respondents agree in principal with Appellants' statement
regarding the disposition of the case in the lower court.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants purchased the property which is the subject matter
of the above-entitled action in 1967.

(TV.II, p.74,1.18)

Plaintiffs

purchased land adjoining Defendants1 property on Defendants'
southern and eastern boundaries in 1969.

(TV.I, p.13, 1.12-22)
i

At the time Plaintiffs purchased the property, they were aware of
a possible boundary dispute or at least the existence of some
problems with the boundary location.
1.3-13)

(TV.I, p.14, 1.18-21, p.35,

Shortly after purchasing their property, Plaintiffs began

making claims that the fence on Defendants' southern boundary was
not the actual boundary line, claiming that the boundary line was
i

actually north of the existing fence extending into property
owned by Defendants.
Plaintiffs eventually filed this law suit.

Thereafter,

I

Defendants hired a registered land surveyor, Randy Bott, of
Century Surveyors, to survey the property to determine the actual
boundary.

As a result of that survey (often referred to as the

<

"Bott Survey11), it was discovered that the original northeast
corner of Lot 12, Block 34, Providence Farm Survey, which was the
beginning point of reference for Plaintiffs' legal description,
was not where Plaintiffs had claimed it to be.

The original

northeast corner of Lot 12 was 33 feet south of where Plaintiffs
claim the northeast corner to be. (TV.II, p.125, 1.3-15)
Defendants thereby discovered that their property not only went
to the fence on the southern boundary, but extended a few feet
beyond (south) the existing fence.
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Except for the location of the northeast corner of Lot 12#
Block 34,

Providence Farm Survey, all other matters were

stipulated to by the parties at trial.

Pursuant to the

stipulation of the parties, the only matter for determination by
the jury was the location of the northeast corner, which would in
turn determine the actual boundary line between the properties
owned by Defendants and Plaintiffs.
The jury, after hearing the facts, evidence and testimony,
(which primarily consisted of testimony from four expert
witnesses; Ken Spires and Clyde Naylor testifying on behalf of
Plaintiffs, and Randy Bott and Louis Hickman testifying on behalf
of Defendants) determined that the northeast corner of Lot 12
was located where Defendants claimed it to be.
Jury, District Court Record, p. 52)

(Verdict of the

Plaintiffs then filed a

Motion for Judgement Notwithstanding the Verdict or for a New
Trial.

The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' Motion and ordered

that Judgement be entered according to the verdict of the jury.
(Memorandum Decision, District Court Record, pp. 92, 93; Order,
District Court Record, p. 100; See also Defendants' Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgement Notwithstanding
the Verdict)

Plaintiffs then appealed this matter to the Supreme

Court of the State of Utah.
ARGUMENTS
I.
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED AS A MATTER OF LAW TO A JURY TRIAL.
A quick review of the law on a party's right to a jury trial
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in a quiet title action indicates that many states do not allow
trial by jury for such actions.

However, Utah has long since

decided that a party to a quiet title action has a right to
demand a jury trial.

In Holland v. Wilson, 327 P.2d 250, 252

(Utah 1958) this court stated:
We are further of the opinion that although historically
an action to quiet title was originally equitable and
the law courts had no jurisdiction to grant such
relief, that situation does not prevail in this case.
Formerly the equity courts afforded relief because
there was no adequate remedy at law. In this
jurisdiction, however, there is an adequate remedy
provided by statute under the provisions of chapter 40
of title 78 U.C.A. 1953. Likewise in this state the
distinctions between law and equity actions have been
abolished by Article VIII, Sec. 19, of the Constitution of
Utah.
We are further of the opinion that the right to a jury
trial in this type of case is assured by Section 78-21-1,
U.C.A. 1953 which declares:
Right to jury trial. - In actions for the
recovery of specific real or personal property,
with or without damages . . . . an issue of
fact may be tried by jury, unless a jury trial
is waived . . . .
The Holland case was an action by the plaintiff to quiet
title to certain unpatented mining claims.

In its pretrial, the

trial court had designated as an issue of fact the question of
whether the defendants had done assessment work for the year
ending July 1, 1954 on the claims involved in the law suit.

The

trial court had refused the plaintiff's request for a jury
trial, and on appeal the only question to be decided by the
Utah Supreme Court was whether or not Plaintiffs had an absolute
right to have the issues of fact determined by a jury when a
proper demand was made therefor.

This court stated: "We are of

the opinion that there can no longer be any question as to this

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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right."

327 P.2d at 251. The Supreme Court further said:

It is our opinion that the above language [refering to
Section 78-21-1 U.C.A. 1953], if given reasonable and
rational construction, must be interpreted as
declaring that all issues of fact relating to possession
of specific real and personal property may be determined
by a jury unless a jury trial is waived. 327 P.2d at 252.
The instant case, as designated in Appelants' brief, is an
action to quiet title to real property.

The only issue put to

the jury for the jury's determination was purely a factual issue,
that being the factual location of the northeast corner of Lot
12, Block 34, Providence Farm Survey.

At trial, Plaintiffs

contended that the original northeast corner had moved and
changed from where it had been placed and that by usage and
history the original northeast corner became the corner of the
Larsen fence.

Defendants contended that the original northeast

corner did not move; that it was located where the plats,
surveys, deeds and other records indicated it would be,

i.e.

1320 feet directly north of the southeast corner of Lot 12, Block
34.

All of the evidence presented to the jury, which included

the location of fences, monuments, possession lines, surveys,
plats, deeds, techniques used in surveying, historical and common
usage, etc., was presented in an attempt to convince the jury of
the true location of that northeast corner, which was purely a
factual issue properly put to the jury for its determination.
II.
THE JURY'S VERDICT MUST STAND UNLESS IT IS CLEARLY SHOWN
THAT THERE WAS NO REASONABLE BASIS IN THE EVIDENCE TO
JUSTIFY THE VERDICE AS GIVEN.
Utah case law is rich with authority detailing the scope of
review and the Supreme Court's right to overturn the jury's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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verdict.

Those cases principally deal with the amount of

evidence which is required to support the jury's verdict and
whose favor the evidence must be viewed.

The following cases

are a synopsis of rulings on this issue from the Utah Supreme
Court:
Ute - Cal Land Development Corp. v. Sather, Utah,
605 P.2d 1240, 1245 (1980): In viewing this evidence,
this Court will upset the jury verdict only upon a
showing by the appealing party that the evidence so
clearly preponderates in his favor reasonable people
could not differ on the outcome of the case. Also in
determining if there was sufficient evidence to support
the jury's verdict this Court will consider those facts
which most strongly support the verdict and where there
is any conflict in the evidence this Court will
consider as true that evidence which supports the
verdict.
Gilhespie v. DeJong, Utah, 520 P.2d 878, 880 (1974):
This case falls within these pronouncements we have
often made: that the parties appear to have had what
they are entitled to: a full and fair opportunity to
present their contentions, and the evidence supporting
them, to the court and jury, and to have a verdict and
judgment entered thereon. When this has been done, all
presumptions are in favor of the validity of the
verdict and judgment; and this court will not distrurb
them unless there is substantial and prejudicial error,
absent which there is a reasonable likelihood that
there would have been a different result.
Gossner v. Dairymen Associates, Inc., Utah, 611 P.2d
713, 715 (1980): This Court assumes the jury believed
those aspects of the evidence which sustain the
findings and the judgment, and therefore makes its
analysis of the case and draws its conclusions on the
basis of the facts so found.
E. A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. W. C.
Foy & Sons, Inc., Utah, 665 P.2d 1320, 1322 (1983): It
is the prerogative of the jury to resolve issues of
fact, and the accepted rules of appellate review
preclude this Court from substituting its judgment for
that of the jury on issues of fact. On appeal, we view
the evidence in the light most supportive of the
verdict, and assume that the jury believed those
aspects of the evidence which sustain its findings and
judgment. We will upset a jury verdict only upon a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law6Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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showing that the evidence so clearly preponderates in
favor of the appellant that reasonable people would not
differ on the outcome of the case,
Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, Utah, 667 P2d 598, 601 (1983):
It is the exclusive province of the jury to determine
the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence,
and make findings of fact. Williams v. Lloyd, 16 Utah
2d 427, 429-30, 403 P.2d 166, 167 (1965); Joseph v.
W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94,
99-100, 348 P.2d 935, 938 (1960). Where the evidence
is conflicting and the jury is properly instructed, we
do not upset those findings of fact on appeal except
upon a showing that the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict, so clearly preponderated
in appellant's favor that reasonable persons could not
differ on the outcome of the case. Ute-Cal Land
Development Corp. v. Sather, Utah, 605 P.2d 1240, 1245
(1980); Nelson v. Watts, Utah, 563 P.2d 798, 799
(1977).
Each of the above-cited cases holds, in essence, that the
Supreme Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, the Respondant, and that the verdict of the
jury can only be overturned if, in viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to the Respondant, the court finds that
there is no substantial basis in the evidence which would support
the jury's verdict or that there was substantial and prejudicial
error, without which there is a reasonable liklihood that there
would have been a different result.
III.
THERE IS CONSIDERABLE AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT
In his Memorandum Decision denying Appellant's Motion for
Judgement Notwithstanding the Verdict or for a New Trial, the
Honorable Omer J. Call, trial judge in the instant action,
stated:
. . . suffice it to say that in the court's opinion
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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there was substantial competent evidence to sustain the
jury's verdict and therefore the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Judgement Notwithstanding the Verdict Or In The
Alternative For A Retrial should be denied. The court
regards the jury's decision as affecting the North
South boundary line between these parties, and the other
results stipulated to by the parties. (Memorandum Decision,
District Court Record, p. 93)
The evidence referred to by the trial court consists
primarily of Mr. Bott's survey (Exhibit 8), the Martineau
Plat (Exhibit 1), the 1896 plat (Exhibit 30) the map of the
Providence township (Exhibit 35) the Cache County Plat
(Exhibit 2), the Albern E. Allen Abstract (Exhibit 37) which
included

numerous deeds, testimony from Randy L. Bott, a

registered land surveyor, and testimony from Louis Hickman, a
licensed engineer, land surveyor and certified abstractor.
In order to appeal the admissibility of evidence presented
at trial, Appellants are required to make a timely objection at
the time of trial.

Appellants accepted both Mr. Bott and Mr.

Hickman as expert witnesses (TV.II, p.106, 1.18; TV.Ill, p.5,
1.19) and did not object to the evidence presented by Defendants
and received by the trial court.

In fact, it was Plaintiffs who

introduced the Martineau Plat and the Bott Survey into evidence.
Plaintiffs cannot now attack the evidence presented by Defendants
as unlawful, unfounded, or invalid or attempt to say what
evidence is better than other evidence.

It is the sole province

of the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and
exhibits and to weigh in their own minds the value of the
testimony presented by both sides.

E. A. Strout Western Realty

Agency, Inc. W.C. Foy & Sons, Inc., supra; Groen v. T r i - Q - I n c ,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law8Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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supra; Cintron v. Milkovich, Utah, 611 P.2d 730, 732 (1980). Once
the jury has weighed the evidence and entered its verdict, the
sole issue on appeal is to determine if there is any reasonable
basis in the evidence to support the jury's verdict or if there
were subtantial and prejudicial errors, without which there is a
reasonable lik&ihood the jury's verdict would have been
different.

In the instant case there is ample evidence to

support the decision and there were no substantial and
prejudicial errors committed at trial.

Even if there were errors

committed at trial, it is unlikely the jury's verdict would have
been any different.
Mr. Bott testified that the record distance, according to the
Martineau survey and other plats and deeds, from the south line
of Lot 12 (which is a known line agreed to by all parties) to
the center line of 7th South Street was 2,065.23 feet (TV.II,
p.119, 1.25) and that he measured the distance on .the ground as
2,065.55 feet. (TV.II, p.120, 1.1)

Mr. Spiers (expert witness

for the Plaintiff) testified that the measured distance from the
south line of Lot 12 to the center line of 7th South was 2,067 feet
(TV.I, p.78, 1.20-23; TV.I, p.82, 1.8-12; TV.I, p.84, 1.5-11)
which is 1.77 feet farther than the record measurement called
for in the ancient plats.

Mr. Bott also testified that the

record distance from the southeast corner of lot 12, which is
agreed by all parties to be a known location, to the northeast
corner of lot 12 was 1320 feet (TV.II, pl22, 1.20-25); that the
original and subsequent plats and surveys called for a 66 foot
road (4 rods) and that the distance from the southeast corner of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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I
Block 8 to 700 South Street was 660 feet.

(TV.II, p.122, 1.14)

Several witnesses testified that the measured distance from the
southeast corner of Lot 12 to the present south line of 800 South

*

(or what has been referred to in the trial as the Larsen fence and
claimed by Plaintiffs as the northeast corner of lot 12) is
approximately 1350.5 to 1354-5 feet (TV.I, p. 82, 1.12; TV.II, p.

<

63, 1.20; TV.II, p.121, 1.6), and that the distance from the
Larsen fence, on the present south side of 800 south to the fence
on the north side of 800 South was 33 feet.

Mr. Bott testified

{

that the record distance from the southeast corner of lot 12 to
the south line of lot 8, which is the north side of the present
800 south street, is 1320 feet plus 66 feet or 1386 feet.

{

(TV.I, p.49, 1.16-18; TV.II, p. 39, 1.12-22; TV.II p. 125, 1.1011) The measured

distance from the southeast corner of lot 12 to

the south line of lot 8, or the north side of 800 South was

(

measured by Mr. Bott to be 1386 feet, (TV.II, p.122, 1.20-25, p.
123, 1.1-6) which completely agrees with the record distances
established in the ancient plat surveys; was measured by Mr.

(

Spires to be 1387.5 feet (TV.I, p.82, p.84, 1.11) for a diference
of 1.5 feet; and was measured by Mr. Naylor to be 1386.5 feet,
(TV.II, p.63, 1.20, p. 39, 1.21-22) for a difference of .5 feet.

{

Mr. Bott concluded therefrom, and so testified, that lot 12
had been laid out on the ground as a lot 1320 feet north and
{

south by 660 feet east and west, that a 66 foot road had been
laid out between lot 12 and lot 8, and that the south line of lot
8 was laid out to be 1386 feet from the south line of lot 12.
(TV.II, p.142, 1.6-21)

This was confirmed by the record

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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measurements and by actual measurements on the ground.

Mr. Bott

also concluded that the northeast corner of lot 12 was 1320 feet
directly north of the southeast corner of lot 12, (RV.II, p.125/
1.3-15) ironically only about 33 feet south of where Mr. Spires
and Mr. Naylor had placed the northeast corner of lot 12 and they
both allowed for only a 33 foot road instead of 66 feet as called
for in the ancient plats.
Mr. Hickman testified that the record distances indicated on
the ancient plats and the

measured distances in the Bott survey

collaborated one another. (TV.Ill, p. 18, 1.19-23)

Mr. Hickman

and Mr. Bott each testified that the standard historical distance
of lots when originally platted and laid out on the ground was
80 rods by 40 rods (1320 feet by 660 feet), or a quarter of a
mile by one eighth of a mile, and that a 4 rod (66 foot) road was
also the standard width for platted roads. (TV.II, p.141, 1.12-25;
TV.III, p.9, 1.3-24)

This standard distance of 1320 feet from the

southeast corner of lot 12 to the northeast corner of Lot 12 was
also substantiated by the 1896 plat, (Exhibit 30), the
Providence town map (Exhibit 35) and the official Cache County
Plat (Exhibit 2).

This distance is also well established in the

original deeds transfering the property.

The deeds referenced in

the Albern Allen abstract (Exhibit 37), beginning with the
transfer from Milton D. Hammond to Mattie Hansen (number 6 in
said Abstract) dated January 12, 1877, transfered the "west part
of the north part of Lot 12, block 34, Plat A, Providence Farm
Survey," and stated that the dimensions of the parcel were 40
rods by 20 rods (1660 feet by 330 feet) and contained 5 acres.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I

i

Mr. Hickman testified that the with those stated dimensions for
the west part of the north part of Lot 12, the dimensions of the
entire Lot 12 would be 1320 feet by 660 feet, (TV.Ill, p.18,

*

1.14-18) which were the platted dimensions on all of aforereferenced plats.

That parcel continued to be a 5 acre parcel,

40 rods by 20 rods, until Albern Allen deeded a 40 foot strip at

^

the bottom (south) of said parcel to Charles Miller, Appellants*
predecessor in title.

Mr. Allen then deeded the remainder of the

parcel, which was then 620 feet by 330 feet (20 rods) to

<

Respondant herein in 1967 who has held title to the property ever
since.

(Exhibit 9)
i

As stated earlier, although Plaintiffs/Appellants first
introduced the Martineau Plat into evidence as Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 1 and originally relied on said Plat as the basis for
A

their current surveys, (TV. I, p. 65, 1.14-17, p. 67, 1.3-9)
Appellants now attempt to disparage and discredit the Martineau
plat as being an unauthenticated "office survey."

It is stated
\

in 12 Am Jur 2d, Boundaries, Section 113, that an ancient survey
made by a competent authority and recorded or accepted as a
public document, produced from proper custody, is admissible in
i

evidence without further verification to prove the location of
the boundary line.

It is further stated in 12 Am Jur 2d,

Boundaries, Section 115, that an original map, over 30 years old,
found in proper custody, authorized and recognized as an official
document, and free on its face of suspicion, is admissible in
evidence as an "ancient document" to prove the location of the
l

boundary line.

Certainly the Martineau Plat dated 1880 and the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1896 plat

(Exhibit 30) constitute ancient surveys and/or ancient

documents which have been referred to by the witnessess and
relied on by the witnesses and have been recognized as official
documents by the Cache County Recorder.
The ancient documents, and other maps, plats, and deeds
relied on by the Respondents, and the testimony of Respondents
witnessess constitute substantial creditable evidence more than
sufficient to justify the jury's verdict in favor of Respondents.
Plaintiff's objections to the ancient plats, if given any merit
at all, go to the weight of such evidence, not to the
admissibility of said plats.
IV.
THE JURY'S VERDICT AFFECTS ONLY THE PARTIES INVOLVED TO
ESTABLISH THE BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN THEM AND DOES NOT
IMPACT SURROUNDING PROPERTY OWNERS
Throughout the trial and this appeal Appellants have raised
the emotional and rather imaterial claim that all property owners
in the area will be affected by the jury's verdict, even
suggesting that boundary lines would have to shifted.

To the

contrary, it is well recognized that the only parties affected by
the decision of the jury are the parties involved in the
litigation and the only impact of the jury's decision is to
determine the location of the lot corner which in turn by
stipulation determines the boundary line disputed by the parties.
In Fisher v. Davis, 77 Utah 81, 291 P. 493 (1930), an action
to quiet title to mining claims in Wasatch County, the Supreme
Court of Utah stated that the decree quieting title to the claims
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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would only bind the parties to the action.

The Appellant in the

case had maintained that the Court's decision was in error
because it had been shown at trial that other parties may claim
an interest in the mining claims.

This Court held that those

other parties could still maintain an action regarding the mining
claims and that the decision to quiet title only affected the
parties involved.
In the instant case, the verdict of the jury only decides
and resolves the boundary dispute between the parties in this
action and does not locate the northeast corner of lot 12 for any
other person nor does the jury's decision adversely affect anyone
else.

Appellants' assertion otherwise would require the District

Court in future actions to ignore the longstanding legal
doctrines regarding res judicata and collateral estoppel.
V.
APPELLANTS CANNOT ASSIGN ERROR TO THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL
TO GIVE PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS WHEN NO OBJECTION WAS ENTERED
NOR ANY EXCEPTION TAKEN.
Appellants have continually attempted to assign error to the
trial court's failure to give certain jury instructions requested
by Appellant at trial.

The Utah Supreme Court has recently

stated in State v. Evans, 668 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1983):
"Generally for a party to be in a position to complain of the
trial courts failure to give an instruction, he must first propos
the instruction and then take exception to the courts refusal to
give it."

The Court cited State v. Pierren, 583 P.2d 69 (Utah

1978) wherein this Court had stated:
Generally, for a party to take advantage of the trial
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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courtfs failure to give full and correct instructions,
he must first propose correct instructions, and should
the court fail to give them, to then except thereto.
583 P.2d at 71.
It is further stated in Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure:

"no party may assign the error of giving or failure

to give an instruction unless he objects thereto."
Appellants failed to enter objections to the trial court's
refusal to give requested jury instructions in the record and
failed to take exception to jury instructions given or not given.
Appellants now attempt to create a record which never existed by
listing in their brief jury instructions which may or may not
have been requested of the court and by suggesting in their brief
how instructions were modified by the trial court.

Respondants

do not wish to impune the character or integrity of Appellants or
their counsel, but submit that Appellants cannot be allowed to
create for this appeal a record not in existence when there is no
possiblity of acurately establishing what actually transpired at
the trial court level.

Appellants must be bound by the record

and transcript prepared by the duly certified shorthand reporter.
Furthermore, at the hearing requested by Appellants to
settle the record regarding jury instructions held on November
18, 1983, more than five months after the trial, Judge Call
stated that he did recall Plaintiffs' objecting to the court's
allowing a jury trial (Transcript of Court Proceedings, November
18, 1983, p. 24, 1.8-13) but also stated that he had no specific
recollection regarding jury instructions (ibid p. 25, 1.1-6) or
that he had precluded anyone from excepting to instructions (ibid
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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p. 25, 1.6-10).

If the trial court cannot make a determination

regarding proposed jury instructions, certainly this Court cannot

(

do so.
CONCLUSIONS
*

Appellants have failed to show any substantial and
prejudicial error in the trial proceedings or that the outcome of
the trial would have been any different if there were errors at
trial.
The essence of Plaintiffs1 appeal is a challenge of the
facts, not the law.

The parties at trial mutually stipulated to

waive all other claims and to proceed to trial on the sole

'

factual issue of the location of the lot corner.
Appellants now contend that the Bott Survey and other
evidence and testimony presented by Respondents at trial was
illegal, and thus, the jury's verdict is not supported by lawful
evidence.

Appellants however, failed to timely object to the

evidence and testimony as being illegal.
introduced some of the evidence

In fact, Appellants

relied on by Respondents.

Since all of the documents and testimony were received

'

into evidence by the trial court without objection from
Appellants, it was then up to the jury to determine the weight and
credibility they wished to give the evidence and enter a verdict.

*

There can no longer be any question as to the legality of the
evidence and this court cannot second guess the jury in
attempting to determine how the jury perceived the evidence.
Court must assume that the jury believed those aspects of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The

*

evidence which sustain the verdict.
A review of the record transcript readily reveals that the
recitals of fact in Appellants' brief are remarkably opinionated.
Appellants subjective conclusions of fact merely reinforce the
principal issue of this case, i.e., the same facts can be viewed
differently by different people.

Once evidence is received by

the Court, however, it then becomes the sole province of the trier
of fact (in this case the jury) and not the parties to determine
what is to believed and accepted, and what is not.
In this action, the jury chose to believe the evidence which
supported the Respondents' position, and so entered their vedict.
It is respectfully submitted that the verdict is supported by
substantial evidence; that no substantial and prejudicial errors
were committed at trial; and that any error which may have been
committed was inconsequential and would not have changed the
verdict had there been no error.
Respondents respectfully request that the jury's verdict be
sustained and that this appeal be dismissed as having no merit.

DATED this

t

day of March, 1984.

C. JENKINS & ASSOCIATES

/ Attorney fotf
/
L defendants/respondents
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 "7

<

CASES AND AUTHORITY CITED
;

. ,f.,t....

,-;,,, •.

. ,

Cintron v. Millcovich,
Utah, 611 P.2d 730 (1980).

P a g e

9

E. A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. W. C. Foy and Sons, Inc.,
Utah, 665 P.2d 1320, 1322 (1983):
^~*—
Fisher v. Davis,
77 Utah 81, 291 P. 493 (1930)
Gilhespie v. DeJong,
Utah, 520 P.2d 878, 880 (1974):

13

6

Goen v. Tri-0-Inc,
Utah, 667 P.2d 598, 601 (1983):

7, 8

Gossner v. Dairymen Associations, Inc.,
Utah,—611 P.2d /I3,—/lb (1980):

6

Holland v. Wilson,
Utah, 357 p.2d 250 (1958).

4

State v. Evans,
Utah, 668 P.2d 566 (1983)

14

State v. Pierren,
Utah, 583 P.2d 69 (1978)

14

Ute-Cal Land Development Corp. v. Sather,
Utah, 605 P.2d 1240, 1245 11980):. . . . . . . . . . .
12 Am. Jur. 2d,
Boundaries, Sections 113, 115. . . . .

6

12

STATUTES
Constitution of the State of Utah,
Article VIII, Section 19

4

Utah Code Annotated, 1953
Section 78-21-1

4, 5

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 51

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
18OCR, may contain errors.

15

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed on the

day of March, 1984 to Bill

Hansen, attorney for Plaintiffs at 201 East 100 North, P.O. Box
67, Payson, Utah 84651-0067, by depositing the same with the U.S.
Mail postage prepaid and addressed as stated.

Secretary

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

